The 5 neo-Nazi bombs on the networks

The 5 neo-Nazi bombs on the networks

Cacildo Marques - Sao Paulo

   The enemy of social networking companies is not the lie nor the scandal with the denunciation of storing customer data. The enemy is the establishing of the strategy of using networks as a platform for neo-Nazi indoctrination, to win elections and command large areas and populations. In the twentieth century email services had already made the decision to censor content of explicit Nazi campaign and outreach of paederoticism (commonly called "pedophilia"). In the political field, the neo-Nazis broke up the siege by reneging on the swastika and disguising their admiration for Mussolini and Hitler. It is not a central part of the effort to build "clubs" for flatearthist, climate refractories or victims of conspiratorial theories, if not as a way of joining ignorant or crazy persons. Also the question of sexual morality is used only as a backdrop, as all hypocrites have done since antiquity. If it was difficult to make a decision to censor these two dangers, swastika and pedophilia, the more difficult it is to veto the five foci of neo-Nazi action, but Internet portals will work against democracy, and against freedom, if they do not proceed to this censorship, because the work of the neo-Nazis today is to dominate the social networks, mainly through videos, to convince those who read little, with the five types of bombs below.

     1) Militarism. Use of military and belicist symbols in political parties, with apology for war and armamentism.
     2) Punitivism. Defense of proposals to reduce the age of criminal liability and to harden punishments.
     3) Fanaticism. Mix of divinity and religiosity with political parties (theocracy).
     4) Racism. Apology of "racial" supremacy and campaigns against immigrants who are poor or come from poor regions.
     5) McCarthyism. Preaching of extemporaneous McCarthyism, with attempts of gags to teachers, artists and reporters.

Brazil: Former president is guilty

Brazil: Former president is guilty

      Cacildo Marques – Sao Paulo

      At the same time that former Brazilian President Luiz Inacio da Silva (Lula) was convicted of corruption for 12 years and one month in prison, South Korean President Park Geun-hye was also sentenced for corruption to 24 years in prison. She went through a process, and received a sentence which is almost double the penalty he received. She did not deny the crime, he did. The detail is that he responds as a defendant for another five processes, almost all dealing with bribery of large companies contractors.

      People from outside Brazil should be surprised that such an important prisoner raves that he is persecuted and innocent, and yet the justice of the country does not listen to him. Unlike the behavior of South Koreans, however, who accept judicial sentences, one of the sad traditions of Brazil is to deny to the ultimate consequences any accusation that one is being targeted.

      Evidences. The ex-Brazilian jailed president directed his defense to brag that there is no evidence against him. The defense followed the order of the client. Instead of scouring the prosecution's pieces, in order to alleviate the sentence, the lawyers spent all the time saying that the evidence was forged, leaving the promoters at ease to work and set up the process. For this first case, in which he was convicted of "dissimulation of ownership" of an apartment he won as a bribe, he could have been sentenced to three years in prison, to be accomplished in freedom, once in the current law of Brazil only who pays more than four years of prison sentence is jailed. With nobody to dismantle the prosecution, the conviction by the judge of first instance, Sergio Moro, was of nine years and the one of the court, in second instance, was even higher, making up those 12 years and one month remembered above. There are at least 22 evidences in the process, including police seized at the defendant's residence. But the defense always repeated "there is no proof".

      Privilege. In certain points, the Brazilian courts in a childlike way gave in to the vagaries of the defendant's lawyers. A "preventive Habeas Corpus" is understood as a piece that the lawyer prepares in advance so that, in case his client is arrested, forward to the court quickly. The defense of the former president understood that preventive Habeas Corpus is to require the court to adjudicate the Habeas Corpus before the defendant is arrested. That was made. Before it was known that the defendant would take that sentence, Brazil's supreme court granted the defense's request and ruled "preventatively" the Habeas Corpus, as applying. The defense, however, was unsuccessful.

      Crisis. The successor of the former president, appointed by him, Dilma Rousseff, completed a four-year term and made many economic mistakes, leading the country to a serious crisis in 2014. Even so, she was elected that year, with a small margin, for a second four-year term. As the crisis did not slow down quickly, although inflation had been reduced, the street riots have intensified. The president had acquired his own flight and no longer consulted the former president weekly, as he did in the first years of the previous term. Now she consulted with Minister Aloizio Mercadante, which infuriated Mr. Da Silva. The reason is that Aloizio Mercadante was the man who took Mr. Da Silva from the trade union and brought him into high politics. He is the creator of him, just as Caesar created Brutus (which participated in his murder), Jesus Christ created Peter (who denied him three times), and Agrippina created Nero (who led her to death). Mercadante, who did not win any office in Da Silva's two terms (for his luck, or else he would be wound up with justice), in the Dilma Rousseff administration began as Minister of Science, became Minister of Education, and finally came to occupy the central post of Chief Minister of the Civil House. Mr. Da Silva accused him of being a bad negotiator and very closed inside himself. It was then that the president appointed Vice-President Michel Temer as "political articulator", with the task of making the connection between the chief minister and the parliament. With much experience in the House of Representatives, the vice president was doing this with competence and success. With that pair in the political area and Joaquim Levy taking care of finances in the Ministry of Finance, little by little the crisis was being removed. But one day the vice president delivered a sentence which, according to Mr. Da Silva, revealed his secret intentions. Temer said, "Brazil needs someone to unify it". It was stated that the vice president showed interest in overthrowing the president and taking her place. Mr. Da Silva, seconded by the president of his Workers Party, Rui Falcao, insistently demanded the president to remove Mercadante and Temer. Mercadante, an old friend of the author of this present text, colleague in the struggle against the 1964 military regime, invented the political man Da Silva and led him to contest the presidential election in the demagogic Luis-Bonapartist system (1848) that unhappy the Latin America for more than one century and Islam for some decades, with Turkey as the youngest member of the club, regardless of whether the model is necessarily failed.

      Agreement. The president of the House of Representatives, Eduardo Cunha, of the MDB (Brazilian Democratic Movement), party of the vice president, did not have affinities with the president and was accused of corruption crimes. She had received 11 requests for impeachment of the president, but kept them in the drawer, in the hope that the president and her party would protect him, not interfering so that he would be overthrown and brought to justice. It happened that a Minister of Education, Cid Gomes, gave a lecture at a university where he accused the Representatives to be a bunch of thieves and packers. The president of the House, Eduardo Cunha, went to the palace to demand the president to fire the minister. Initially she was reluctant, but he pressed and finally the president called the minister and made him ask to be exonerated. In Sao Bernardo, Mr. Da Silva felt that his pupil, the president he had indicated, had acquired complete independence from her mentor, who it was him, Da Silva. Not only did he advise himself with Aloizio, but she dismissed the minister at the request of the president of the Low Chamber. He decided to depart for the attack. He announced, together with Rui Falcao, that there would be no agreement with Eduardo Cunha, since the president could not condone with bandit (previously she could it). Eduardo Cunha, on his side, pulled the 11 processes of impeachment out of the drawer and had the one he considered more consistent.

      Impeachment. Mr. Da Silva had succeeded in overthrowing his preeminent positions with Vice-President Michel Temer and the Chief Minister Aloizio Mercadante. His wish was for the president to leave Mercadante without charge, but she returned it to the Ministry of Education. Mr. Da Silva then sought a way to put himself above Mercadante. The president had installed as chief minister the former governor of Bahia, Jaques Wagner, who had been playing a half-erased role. Da Silva demanded the position. In those days, justice was finalizing lawsuits and he, Da Silva, risked being arrested. If he were to be sworn in as a minister, he would gain a forum prerogative and be free from the first instance, passing into the hands of the supreme court, whose judges were mostly appointed by him and the president. Pressured by the urgency, president called the institute where the former president was in Sao Paulo, advising that he was sending Mr. "Bessias", a clerk, for him to sign, before any emergency. Judge Sergio Moro had been recording calls from that institute, with permission of the courts. At the time of the president's phone call, the time allowed for recording had already been exceeded, but this did not prevented the judge from divulging the speech content. That was the biggest conversation scandal in the 13 years of the Workers' Party government, because it was wide open that the position would serve to free Mr. Da Silva from justice. The inauguration did not occur, obviously. The process of impeachment soon began to process. The piece was chosen by the jurists Helio Bicudo, Janaina Paschoal and Miguel Reale Junior. The accusation was that the president committed a crime against the public purse when using loans from public banks without authorization from parliament. The file was spelled out of "fiscal pedals". The impeachment passed in the House with a loose vote against the chief of State. By rule constitutional, the president was dismissed for six months, being replaced in office by the vice president, until the Senate to emit its verdict. Senators from the Workers' Party could have used these six months to make policy in favor of the president, but they spent that time burning the barn. It was six months of verbal attacks on all party parliamentarians they called "putschist". The Senate vote simply confirmed the Low Chamber's decision. A few months later, the supreme court removed the position of Eduardo Cunha, which led him to have his mandate revoked and finally to be arrested.

      Dilma. As a cadre from the Labor Democratic Party (PDT) rather than the Workers Party, Dilma Rousseff joined her new party by disagreements of alliances in the State of Rio Grande do Sul, winning positions in the state government. The leader of the PDT, Leonel Brizola, accused her, along with others who followed her, of selling herself "for a dish of lentils". Even though she was not trained in the new party, she incorporated a dangerous belief of the new allies, that "money come from trees", or that "money falls from the sky". Thus, soon after the impeachment, the technicians reworked the budget accounts and realized that two-thirds of the primary public deficit (excluding public debt interest) were being hidden. Instead of having the equivalent of 17 billion US dollars, the new account showed something around 51 billion. Without impeachment, the severe crisis would certainly cease, but there would be no transparency to ascertain where the illusory gain and the real gain would be, even because one of the party's flags is the "social control" of the mass media.

      Plan. The parliamentarians of the president's party were told to outline themselves against the majority. There were 18 senators in a house of 81 seats. The plan was to take the party to the opposition, by the "putschists", so that, in the 2018 election, Mr. Da Silva could be presented as victim. At the time of impeachment, the proportion of popular voters against the president and former president was 80%. Under the plan, the buffer government would fail, and Mr. Da Silva would return to the palace in the arms of the population. But, swiftly, the process on the apartment bribe on the beach was completed earlier, and Mr. Da Silva, who settled in the headquarters of the Sao Bernardo metalworkers' union, hoping that the workers were there to prevent his arrest, surrendered the next day, when he saw that the militants paid 30 reais a day by the Apeoesp (union of public teachers of Sao Paulo) to make barricades were waning. From Sao Bernardo, State of Sao Paulo, he was taken to Curitiba and was detained there in the prison of the Federal Police of that city.

      Candidacy. By the Law of the Clean Sheet, of popular initiative, which he himself sanctioned as president, he could not present himself as a candidate, once those convicted in the lower court are prevented for eight years from pursuing elective positions. To keep his party in evidence, he decided to apply for sub judice, up to the limit of trial periods in court. In order to justify an application that the law vetoes, one insisted in the triple argument that (a) Mr. Da Silva is persecuted, (b) he is wronged for helping the poor, and (c) he was convicted without evidence in a warped plot by courts and strengthened by the country's media. The plan is almost perfect, as the preference for his candidacy, laden with bad faith litigation against the electoral court and perjury, is 39% lacking one month and a half for the election, above all legitimate candidates, and his party is favored by 24% of the voters, leaving in second place the MDB, with 4%, and also the PSDB (Party of the Brazilian Social Democracy), with 4%. In addition, these "theses" are spread outside Brazil by Workers Party members and have persuaded influential people, such as linguist Noam Chomsky, jurist Sarah Cleveland and Senator Bernie Sanders. Formerly a poor metallurgist, Da Silva is now the third richest candidate among the thirteen candidates for the 2018 presidential election, second only to Henrique Meirelles, former president of Bank Boston, and the first one, banker Joao Amoedo. The man nominated as a candidate for vice president on the board of Da Silva, Fernando Haddad, tries to inherit the votes of the former metallurgist, but being secondary in the arrangement cannot participate in the televising debates, which invites only the holders, and who are not arrested. The moment the electoral court officially vetoes the name of Da Silva, the deputy takes the place, like head of board. With no time to cast votes and without the money of the wealthy Company Odebrecht, whose CEO is under house arrest, and previously flooded the election campaigns with money, there is no chance for the Workers' Party.

      Cacildo Marques, publisher of the Citizen Gazette (Gazeta Cidada), Butantan, Sao Paulo.

Urna electrónica o voto en papel - cuál es más manipulable

Urna electrónica o voto en papel - cuál es más manipulable

Cacildo Marques – Sao Paulo

        Algunos parlamentarios andan haciendo discursos vehementes afirmando que las elecciones brasileñas hechas con urna electrónica son fraudulentas. Ellos hacen el discurso y esperan la remuneración al final del mes, sin preocuparse por el hecho de que el discurso es una confesión de crimen: ocupan puestos cuyo acceso ha sido fraudado.

        No, no fue, por más que ellos imaginen eso. Ellos pueden dormir tranquilos, pues su crimen no está en esa esfera. Suponiendo que se vuelva al voto en papel, marcado a bolígrafo, y que se decida recuentar toda la votación de 2018, con 100 millones de billetes, está garantizado que en diez recuentos seguidos habrá diez resultados diferentes.

       Si, manteniendo la urna electrónica, sin imprimir el voto, ya que eso es desperdicio de papel y tinta, decidimos hacer la cuenta, que es electrónica, por diez veces seguidas, en las diez veces el resultado será igual. Y sólo será igual si no se hace manualmente, pero electrónicamente.

         Sin interferencia de la mano humana, excepto en los momentos en que el elector presione la tecla y el técnico transfiera los datos al programa de escrutación, también apretando algunas teclas, la votación atiende al criterio constitucional de la impersonalidad, de forma casi absoluta. En el tiempo del voto marcado en papel, el tribunal nos orientaba a interpretar la voluntad del elector: si lo que él escribió se acercaba al nombre o al número del candidato tal y tal, entonces computábamos el voto para esa persona. Si no pudiéramos descifrar, anulábamos el voto. Nunca un recuento repetiría el resultado del recuento anterior en un colegio electoral de cientos de miles de votantes.

        Hay posibilidad de usar la urna electrónica de modo fraudulento, sí. Esto ocurrirá si un dictador, y tiene que ser dictador, de un país muy pequeño, tenga todos los jueces electorales y todos los técnicos de computación de los tribunales bajo su control. En el momento de importar los registros de las secciones electorales al sistema central de conteo, los técnicos están orientados a anular urnas de reductos electorales del opositor. Secciones en que el partido del dictador gana con holgura son consideradas. Las secciones con victoria de la oposición, se registran como urnas de votos nulos y blancos, simplemente. Los técnicos hacen este trabajo de forma competente, pero eso no basta. Los jueces, que confieren y endosan los resultados, son todos agentes defraudadores, al servicio del partido del dictador. Si uno de ellos resiste a firmar las actas, incluso antes de salir denunciando será dado como desaparecido.
        Está claro que en ese país regido por ese dictador la justicia electoral es puro juego de escena. Si el dictador es mínimamente transparente, abole esa justicia y restaura el viejo sistema de las comisiones electorales, más fáciles de comandar.
        Los electores necesitan percibir que si un dictador nazifascista convoca elecciones importantes, que él quiera defraudar, y cuyas reglas de votación no puedan alterarse de antemano, la primera providencia será abolir las urnas electrónicas. Sólo él no hará esto si es un gran hacker y tiene dominio total sobre los jueces y técnicos. Este dominio él puede tener, pero ser al mismo tiempo un gran entendido de sistemas computacionales ya sería un caso de enfermedad psíquica extrema, pues la persona no puede ser al mismo tiempo especializada en una ciencia dura y especializada en manipular las masas. Además, las masas temen a los científicos así como Drácula teme la trenza de ajo.

        Sí, un dictador inteligente puede usar urnas electrónicas y aún así obtener los resultados que quiere, pero para ello tiene que preparar el terreno antes de la votación. Una de esas providencias es seleccionar el tipo de elector, o el tipo de candidato. En Irán, por ejemplo, el sistema no tendría problemas en la manipulación, pues el Consejo de la Revolución veta candidaturas en que encuentren inconvenientes, no por ser fichas sucias. Finalmente, el dictador puede también hacer cambios en el sistema de representación, abriendo sillas para grupos que lo apoyen y cerrando vagas para áreas de adversarios.

        Los refractarios al voto electrónico hicieron al Congreso Nacional Brasileño aprobar ley que obligaba a la impresión de todos los votos, a efectos de chequeo. Esto nunca se ha hecho en la historia del mundo y no habrá recursos físicos para ello. Como estos proponentes tienen horror de cuentas, lograron la aprobación de la materia sin recibir ningún signo de viabilidad técnica para el proyecto. Los tribunales, que serían los responsables de la aplicación de la medida insana, la rechazaron. Es trágico que el poder judicial legisle, pero en los casos de extrema estupidez él tiene que ejercer esa función. Una contrapropuesta sensata fue la de imprimir por muestreo. Cierto número de urnas sería elegido para control en cada región. Si hay una fuerte sospecha sobre el resultado, se toma esa muestra, que indicará si hubo fraude o no. Los refractarios no aceptaron la idea, porque ellos no conocen los fundamentos de la estadística. Y si conocen algo del área, no lo aceptan.

        En el caso, por ejemplo, de la no entrada de determinada urna o de determinada sección en el procesamiento, lo que debe estar bajo fiscalización de los jueces y de los representantes partidarios, un pequeño detalle deja margen a la crítica en el uso de la urna electrónica, y está relacionado justamente con la impresión al final de la votación. La votación que aparece en la tira de papel impresa es secuencial, de modo que es posible rastrear el voto de un determinado elector. Además, el resultado por sección, que se conoce al final del día porque la urna tiene impresora, muestra cuántos votos cada candidato tuvo en aquel lugar. Si un candidato delincuente compró el voto de alguien que vota allí y al final del día de elección no aparece ningún voto para el comprador, está claro que el elector vendedor lo traicionó, y el delincuente puede querer matarlo. El único problema, pues, identificable en el sistema de votación electrónica está en la impresión que la urna hace, porque la transparencia puede traer problemas a quienes dependen de anonimato. Si el sistema político queda libre de los bribones (y parece que la tendencia es la opuesta), podemos gozar de la transparencia sin ningún trastorno. De cualquier modo, será conveniente que los legisladores repensen esa exposición de resultados por sección electoral.

        Cacildo Marques, profesor de computación para enseñanza media por 17 años, fiscal de escrutinio en los tiempos de MDB y Arena, mesero por 20 años.

Nuevo modelo político anti-miseria

Mapa de expectativa de vida (prieto: 40 años)

Nuevo modelo político anti-miseria

Cacildo Marques - Sao Paulo

    1 - Presidente. Es elegido por el Senado en agosto (de cada año par no bisiesto), mediante una lista triple proporcionada por los gobernadores en marzo, con nombres dispuestos en orden alfabético.
    2 - Experiencia. El indicado a presidente debe tener al menos 50 años de edad, con al menos un mandato electivo cumplido (concejal, alcalde, diputado, gobernador, senador o ministro jefe electo).
    3 - Militar. Si es militar, el presidente debe haber alcanzado la cima de la carrera, como general, y debe haber sido reformado, no pudiendo ser sucessor directo de otro general en la presidencia de la República.
    4 - Residencia. El presidente reside necesariamente en la capital con status histórico - ciudad de Río de Janeiro, en el caso de Brasil; Lagos, en el caso de Nigeria - durante los cuatro años del mandato (contra el Efecto Weimar).
    5 - Vicepresidente. El segundo colocado en la elección hecha por el Senado se convierte en vicepresidente, con una remuneración de 2 salarios mínimos mensuales, si no se está ejerciendo otro cargo público remunerado.
    6 - Unicidad. Queda prohibida la reelección del presidente de la República en cualquier momento.
    7 - Gobierno. El ministro jefe de la Casa Civil, o ministro de gobierno, denominado Coordinador del Gobierno*, es elegido directamente en octubre, para mandato cuatrienal, pudiendo concurrir a un segundo mandato subsiguiente, pero no a un tercero antes de cuarentena de al menos 4 años frente al cargo.
    8 - Chapa. En la candidatura, el ministro jefe forma chapa con dos vicejefes, 1º y 2º, en orden decreciente de edad, necesariamente del mismo partido, que tendrán una remuneración de 2 salarios mínimos mensuales si no están en otro cargo público remunerado.
    9 - Vinculación. La votación para ministro jefe está vinculada partidariamente a la elección de diputados federales, pero no a la de senadores y a las estatales (se realizan dos turnos en uno solo, con el elector votando en 1ª opción y 2ª opción).
    10 - Nueva. El Coordinador, ministro jefe, tiene investidura en el cargo por el nuevo presidente de la República en la capital secular - Río, en el caso de Brasil -, pero él ejerce el cargo en la nueva capital, si existe (Brasilia, en el caso de Brasil), coordinando el ministerio formado en consonancia con el presidente.
    (La elección directa de primer ministro en Israel falló por la dificultad de componer gobierno, lo que se resuelve en la presente propuesta.)
         (*) La expresión "Coordinador del gobierno" es del Dr. Eduardo Jorge.

Los Diez Rallos del Presupuesto en Brasil

                Los diez rallos del presupuesto en Brasil

                Cacildo Marques

    1 - Desoneraciones. Fueron beneficios con el sombrero ajeno, para evitar la crisis, pero ellas apenas empeoraron la situación. La cuota patronal de la previsión social es salario indirecto, y nadie, a no ser el empleado, podría haber dispensado el recogimiento.

    2 - Prouni. El Prouni (programa pro-universidad) sin contrapartida, con el gobierno federal sosteniendo universidades privadas indiscriminadamente, vendría un día a completar el rombo presupuestario. Debe mantenerse solamente para la formación de médicos, ingenieros y profesores de lenguas, ciencias exactas y biológicas, una pequeña minoría en ese universo de millones de universitarios.

    3 - Ciudades. El antifederativo Ministerio de las Ciudades necesita ser extinto con urgencia. Hace obras que deben ser hechas por los prefectos, desautorizando a ellos y' a los gobiernos estatales. Él representa una perversión al proyecto Fundef, del Senador Darcy Ribeiro, de repaso de fondos para la enseñanza primaria a cargo de los municipios.

    4 - BNH. El programa Mi Casa Mi Vida, sucedáneo del BNH (Banco Nacional de Habitación), ahora bajo el paraguas del Ministerio de las Ciudades, es algo escandaloso en la República de Tutela. Lo que es necesario es garantizar la financiación, por la CEF (Caja Económica Federal), e implementar vía BNDES y BB (Banco de Brasil) la formación de fábricas de casas prefabricadas (no de madera), primero como empresas mixtas, luego como empresas privadas.

    5 - Magistrados. La caja de seguridad del Poder Judicial debe volver a separarse de la caja del INSS, revirtiendo la fusión determinada por un ministro de la Hacienda tiempos atrás. Se forma el Instituto de Previsión del Judicial, de la misma forma que el Legislativo tiene su Instituto de Previsión Parlamentaria. El saldo de entrada y salida de recursos desde 2004, relativo al cuadro de la judicatura, debe componer esa caja (jubilados hasta 2003 se mantienen en el sistema actual). Habrá un déficit y ellos necesitarán préstamos de fuera, hasta que acepten equiparar el valor de sus jubilaciones al del Ejecutivo, pero el déficit no será de la Unión ni del INSS. La alternativa a la separación es el celetista de salario mínimo sostener la jubilación de los jueces, conforme prevé la "Reforma Previdencia" del actual ministro de Hacienda.

    6 - Incompetencias. De las grandes estatales, sólo Petrobras revierte el cuadro de pérdidas, incluso explorando las amas de casa con el precio del gas de cocina. Eletrobras y Correos son empresas de recaudación, y deberían tener superávit siempre. Para sanearlas, basta depositar en la jefatura ingenieros capaces, como hizo el gobierno de Sao Paulo en la Sabesp, empresa de aguas. El problema primario está en el factor humano. En segundo lugar, en el mantenimiento de monopolios. Paradigma insano, la ECT, por ejemplo, debe ser dividida en Correo-Norte (TO) e Correo-Sur (SP), ambas con cobertura nacional de actuación. De cada dos agencias (o dos CTs) en ciudad o barrio, la más antigua escoge con quien quedarse y la más joven se queda con la empresa preterida. Como se abre competencia entre estatales, eso no saldrá más caro, pero, al contrario, resultará en una gran reducción de gastos. En lugar de un gigante sin émula, dos medio-gigantes compitiendo.

    7 - Incentivos. La Ley del Bien para las empresas extranjeras schumpeterianas no tiene sentido. Lo que es correcto es incentivar la innovación en empresas con sede en Brasil, multinacionales o no. Otros incentivos fiscales deben revisarse con urgencia.

   8 - Cargos. La gran profusión de cargos de confianza es abuso de una característica del presidencialismo. Es necesario limitar en ley, ya que el sentido común no ha funcionado allí.

    9 - Contratos. Contrataciones dispendiosas de Organizaciones Sociales, de empresas concesionarias de servicio "público" y otras invenciones del thatcherismo arrojaron brutalmente el tesoro, con el apoyo de la gran prensa, que, sin análisis más profundo, lo apoya.

    10 - Desviaciones. La mala gestión oculta corrupción, y los dos fenómenos se confunden. Gastos de auditoría y "compliance" nunca serán demasiados. Nueva Ley de Licitaciones impidiendo las colinas (consorcios), monopolios y los incumplimientos de plazos, al menos, debe ser aprobada con urgencia.